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Abstract 
 
Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the 
development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new 
form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the 
method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it 
lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of 
governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices 
such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, 
Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of 
the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes 
the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced 
cooperation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, 
the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy 
complemented by the co- ordination of national economic policies. The recent 
recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the 
method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and 
arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with 
a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of project- building by key 
elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are 
required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The 
context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change 
either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may 
serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and 
the Union, after all. 
 
Introduction 
 
The open method of co-ordination referred to in the Lisbon summit conclusions is not 
unprecedented. Co-ordination has been present in the Treaty since 1958 where 
Member States promised to co-ordinate their economic policies2 while co-ordination 
of employment issues emerged in the 1970s when the largely ineffective Standing 
Employment Committee was set up (Goetschy, 1999). Both the European 
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2 Art. 103 EEC. 
macroeconomic monitoring procedures introduced in Maastricht3 further developed 
state co-operation, with Essen eventually formalized by the inclusion of an 
employment chapter at Amsterdam. Co- ordination in these two policy spheres 
became more explicit, far-reaching and complex following the establishment of the 
euro-zone. The processes established following the Luxembourg, Cologne and Cardiff 
European Councils frame the context within which co-ordination takes place and have 
become codified as the ‘open method’. Other forms of co-ordination arose in other 
spheres. In justice and home affairs (JHA), practices outside the European 
Community (EC) such as the Trevi Group and Schengen, acted as laboratories for the 
development of European Union (EU) policy eventually encapsulated in the third 
pillar (Monar, 2001; Wallace, 2001). In the defence sphere, driving factors such as the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Yugoslav wars highlighted the need to redefine 
European defence institutions and policy, prompting further co-operation culminating 
in the embryonic but politically significant common European security and defence 
policy (CESDP) (Howorth, 2001; Wallace, 2001). While there is some evidence of 
open coordination in justice and home affairs (Commission, 2001d), the need for 
tightly knit joint planning and shared doctrines calls for a more focused and less open 
form of co-ordination in relation to defence policy (Wallace, 2001). 
 This article takes economic co-ordination in the context of economic and monetary 
union (EMU) as its starting point for an exploration of the development of the open 
method of co-ordination. It addresses the question of whether this method is a new 
form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the open 
method be applied outside the scope of economic policy; and, second, will it 
ultimately lead to transfer of competence to the EU and hence act only as a 
transitional mode of governance? Wallace sets out a useful framework for discussing 
the novelty of the open method: 
 
In the early years the Commission used this technique [co-ordination] to develop 
light co-operation and co-ordination in order to make the case for direct policy 
powers ...  Latterly we can see that this approach of co- ordination, strengthened by 
the contemporary fashion for ‘benchmarking’, is being developed not as a 
transitional mechanism but as a policy mode in its own right ... . The object is not to 
establish a single common framework, but rather to share experience and to 
encourage the spread of best practice. There are some grounds for expecting this to 
be a typical mode in future EU policy-making as an alternative to the formal re-
assignment of policy powers from national to EU level’. (Wallace, 2000, p. 33). 
 
The novelty of the open method in EMU is closely associated with an economic 
paradigm that puts paid to any notion of direct transfer for matters of factor market 
flexibility. This does not mean that the method is sui generis, since the central thrust 
of the Lisbon Conclusions was to extend it to other policy sectors. The method 
developed in economic policy because of the existence of certain conditions such as: 
dominant theoretical framework(s); agreed principles or goals for one policy that 
make co-ordination in others important; a history of project-building by key elites 
who also co-ordinate the new policy area; and a commitment by the Council through 
the explicit articulation of support for the approach. The extent to which the method 
can be successfully applied to other policies depends on the extent to which these or 
similar factors exist. 	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 There are three reasons why the open method may be seen as a new mode of 
governance. First, taking developments in economic policy as our case study, the 
open method emerged to deal with the specific issue of factor (capital and labour) and 
product market flexibility under EMU. Within the current paradigm of sound money 
and sound finance, national responses in the framework of commonly agreed 
parameters to this issue are deemed superior to either uncoordinated national action or 
action via the traditional and more legally structured Community method. Second, as 
EU policy-making moves into politically sensitive areas such as immigration, defence 
and taxation, the centralization of policy formation encapsulated in the Monnet 
method is more problematic due to difficulties in achieving policy convergence and 
popular dissatisfaction with the Union. This has prompted the development of new 
methods of governance that facilitate further Europeanization outside existing 
institutional forms. Third, the open method provides a pragmatic rather than a 
principled answer to the Achilles’ heel of the EU – legitimacy. Legitimation is 
presumed for policy formed at the national level and, even if contested, arguments are 
framed in national rather than EU terms and hence are unlikely to call into question 
fundamentally the role of the EU in facilitating co- ordination. It is, however, 
debatable whether the open method transcends the usual criticisms of governance in 
the EU, notably elitism and opacity. 
 Whether the open method is merely a transitional mechanism of governance is 
answered in part by Dyson’s view that it is intended to bring about a convergence in 
policy-makers’ attitudes towards specific issues. ‘ “Bench- marking” can be a factor 
in reframing domestic discourse and shifting the distribution of power over ideas and 
agenda setting’ (Dyson, 2000a, p. 5). This suggests that the sound money, sound 
finance paradigm is currently seen as a necessary truth, although such truths can 
become contingent in the presence of a changing conceptual paradigm. For example, 
the view that the heterogeneous nature of national economies made monetary union 
impossible was prevalent in many states in the years before EMU. Once member 
governments accepted the sound money, sound finance paradigm for monetary policy, 
other pre- existing barriers, such as diversity in national economies, were surmounted. 
Arguably, as common values begin to grow (through the open method), the possibility 
of a transfer in competence to the EU level could increase. If this happens, the open 
method would be transitional and its novelty as a mode of governance would 
diminish. 
 The article first describes the open method of co-ordination and why it has arisen 
in the context of EMU, before locating it in the broader context of EU governance. 
The institutional and organizational complexity and the importance of key conditions 
for the operation of this form of co-ordination are explored, including recent events 
concerning Ireland, to show the operation of soft policy approaches and the 
limitations of peer pressure and soft law measures. The article then returns to the core 
argument: that the open method is a new mode of governance subject to two caveats. 
First, as the experience of EMU illustrates, the open method is most applicable to a 
policy sector when certain conditions are met. Second, even where the possibility of 
transfer of competence to the EU seems unlikely in a given policy sector, it cannot be 
discounted entirely. The possibility of such transfer is conditional on the given 
context in which the policy is formulated. By modifying this context over time, the 
open method could perhaps serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence 
between the Member States and the Union. 
  
 
I. The Open Method of Co-ordination 
 
The term ‘open method of coordination’ stems from the Lisbon European Council, 
but draws its inspiration from earlier Council meetings at Luxembourg, Cardiff and 
Cologne, where a series of supply-sided policy initiatives were set up. The emphasis 
is on consensus-forming with three elements found in each process: common 
assessment of the economic situation; agreement on the appropriate economic policy 
responses; and acceptance of peer pressure and, where necessary, adjustment of the 
policies being pursued (Commission, 2001, para. 2). The Luxembourg process 
implements the provisions in the employment chapter of the Treaty. It is designed to 
boost the efficiency of labour markets by improving employability, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability (on both sides of industry) and equal opportunities for men and women 
when searching for gainful employment. The process is implemented through an 
annual cycle, which begins with the European Council adopting the ‘employment 
guidelines’ for the whole Union that set employment policy priorities. These 
guidelines avoid the delineation of any common course of action, preferring instead to 
enable national policy initiatives. Thus each state is responsible for formulating its 
national action plan, which specifies how it will pursue the guidelines. The 
Commission and Council then assess the national action plans in a joint employment 
report, passing legally non-binding recommendations, where necessary, on the 
performance of individual states (Goetschy, 2000). Thus, the Luxembourg process 
draws on a spirit of mutual learning, benchmarking, best practice and peer pressure to 
achieve its objectives. 
 The Cardiff process is similar, although structural policy has a broader remit 
addressing product, service and capital markets, labour markets and long-term public 
finances, and hence is a more daunting and long-term project than the more focused 
issue of employment policy. Like the Luxembourg process, the Cardiff process 
reflects the view that, although member governments face similar challenges with 
respect to structural reform, the optimal course of action lies at the national level. The 
process began with the publication of national reports by each government on its 
product and capital markets. The Commission supplemented these with two reports 
on progress in and challenges for, capital, product and labour markets, and public 
finances respectively. This assessment, which is now repeated annually on a modified 
basis is designed to feed into the preparation of the Union’s broad economic policy 
guidelines, the aim being co-ordination of national responses through a system of 
benchmarking, best practice, recommendations and periodic monitoring. 
Finally, the Cologne process brought the Luxembourg and Cardiff processes together 
with the macroeconomic dialogue under the heading of the European Employment 
Pact. The macroeconomic dialogue consists of bi- annual discussions of the policy-
mix at the EU level between the social partners, the European Central Bank, the 
Commission and Council. The dialogue has no legislative powers, nor does it issue 
recommendations or even publish minutes. It is designed as a confidence-building 
measure for participants through confidential exchanges of ideas with a view to 
improving the Union’s overall economic policy mix. 
 The open method of co-ordination was explicitly identified as a form of 
governance at the Lisbon European Council, thus codifying practices developed in the 
Employment Pact (European Council, 2000). The innovation at Lisbon was that these 
practices were to be applied in other policy spheres and in the light of the ten-year 
goal of the EU becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion. The naming and adoption of the method is 
recognition that what was happening in the economic sphere is new in the wider 
context of EU governance. The Council described the open method as a vehicle for 
spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals 
(European Council, 2000a; Commission, 2001c, p. 21). It has four key elements: 
 
• setting short-, medium- and long-term guidelines for the EU with specific 
timetables for their achievements; 
 
• establishing performance indicators and benchmarks tailored to each Member 
State and different sectors which allow comparison of best practice; 
 
• translating targets from the European to the national and regional levels; and 
 
• periodic monitoring, peer review and evaluation with the emphasis placed on 
the process of mutual learning. 
 
‘Open’ can refer to state action, policy outcome or a ̀ la carte involvement by states. 
Targets are set for the Union, but national responses are formulated at the national 
level with no threat of formal sanction. The commitment to this decentralized 
approach is made explicit in the Lisbon Conclusions (European Council, 2000a, para. 
38). With regard to outcomes, the comparatively vague nature of the policy targets in 
the open method introduces uncertainty about likely consequences and whether or not 
state-centric governance will remain the norm. So far, the method concerns all 
Member States, whether in the eurozone or not. The method is designed not only to 
deliver policy outcomes, but also to act as a process for improving policy formation. 
Benchmarking, which goes to the heart of the open method, became widespread in 
industry and was pushed as a tool for guiding EC policies by the European Round 
Table of Industrialists (Sisson and Marginson, 2001, p. 2; Wallace, 2001). National 
policy-makers began to use benchmarking in the 1980s. At the same time persistent 
high levels of unemployment throughout the EU prompted calls for co-ordinated 
action, while the start of the third stage of EMU created further impetus for closer co-
ordination of economic policy. The Irish Presidency saw the attraction of 
benchmarking that allowed working towards common goals without encroaching on 
national sovereignty, thus promoting a technique common in the OECD (and thus 
familiar to the Member States) (Wallace, 2001). Benchmarking has no accepted 
definition (Public Sector Benchmarking Service, 2001) although the emphasis in the 
open method on understanding how it is that others operate and why it is they behave 
in a particular manner in the light of agreed guidelines – through such practices as 
reverse engineering – falls within a broad understanding of the term. 
 As can be seen from Table 1, the open method is linked to a variety of policies 
where states are capable of proceeding individually, but are unsure of the best path to 
take, where collective action is needed for any reform, or there are increased returns 
from such collective action (Mosher, 2000). The method institutionalizes the sharing 
of experience and reform experimentation, re- moving any real or apparent risk of 
regulatory competition and replacing it with a co-operative but non-binding method. 
In some sectors, such as information society, policy initiatives have been launched, 
while in others, such as research, initiatives remain at the preparatory stage. The 
method is being applied in new areas, such as pension reform and education policy 
(Council, 2001, paras 32 and 10) and elements of the method (benchmarking, peer 
review) can be seen in the Lamfalussy Report and its proposals for regulation of an 
integrated European securities market (Lamfalussy, 2001). 
 
Table 1: The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action 
 
Origin Policy Description 
Lisbon European Council, 2000 
 
Lisbon European Council, 2000 
 
Benchmark implementation of 
the March eEurope action plan. 
Ensure actions are carried out 
efficiently, effectively and with 
a high profile. Implementation 
of the plan in each Member 
State reviewed annually at the 
spring European Council 
 
Lisbon European Council 
 
Research policy 
 
Benchmark national research 
and development policies. 
Identify indicators for assessing 
performance in different fields 
with a view to developing a 
European research area. 
Commission to draw up a 
European innovation scoreboard 
and 
a map of research excellence 
 
Lisbon European Council 
 
Entrepreneurial policy 
 
Benchmark the process of 
starting a business in each 
Member State. The Commission 
to devise a coordinated strategy 
to simplify the Union’s 
regulatory environment 
 
Lisbon European Council 
 
Social policy 
 
Member States to draw up 
national action plans on poverty 
and social exclusion by June 
2001; to devise indicators for 
assessing progress and policy 
mechanisms for enforcing the 
Union’s objectives in this area 
 
Feira European Council, June 
2000 
 
Enterprise policy 
 
To complete a review of how 
the interests of small businesses 
are represented at EU and 
national level, including through 
the social dialogue 
 
Stockholm European Council, 
March 2001 
Education policy 
 
To present a detailed work 
programme on the follow-up of 
the objectives of education and 
 training systems, including an 
assessment of their achievement 
at the national level 
 
Stockholm European Council 
 
Enlargement 
 
To develop ways and means of 
actively involving the candidate 
countries in the goals and 
procedures of the Lisbon 
strategy 
 
Stockholm European Council 
 
Pension reform 
 
To apply the open method to 
ensure the adequacy of health 
care, the care of the elderly and 
pension systems 
 
 
The Union is committed to involving candidate countries in the Lisbon strategy. 
While such commitment is not yet supported by action, the open method has been 
applied to accession countries in practice in the joint action plans. Under these plans 
the candidate country draws up a national action plan to prepare its jobs market for 
EU membership, which is then jointly reviewed by its own government and the 
European Commission. Legally non-binding recommendations can be issued against 
the country when necessary. For example, when assessing Estonia’s national action 
plan recently, the Commission praised restructuring efforts, but drew attention to 
remaining structural rigidities in Estonia’s labour market and the need for education 
and training (Commission, 2001a). The influence of the open method can be seen in 
the Baltic region. In 1999 Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia 
launched the Baltic Sea region sector programme on labour-market policy, modelled 
on the European Employment Pact and motivated by significant labour market 
challenges in the region, notably high levels of unemployment. The objective of the 
programme is to achieve ‘policy integration’ for the labour market by sharing 
experiences and exchanging best practice (Arbejdsministeriet, 1999). 
 The open method is similar to policy transfer, i.e. a process in which ‘governments 
study each other’s different methods, gauge the success of various policy alternatives 
and mimic best practices employed elsewhere, with successful policies transferred 
deliberately and willingly’ (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000, p. 6). Dolowitz and Marsh 
distinguish between three broad varieties of policy transfer. First, voluntary transfer is 
primarily motivated by dissatisfaction on the part of policy-makers with existing 
policy arrangements. Second, direct coercive transfer occurs when one government 
compels another to adopt a certain policy. Finally, indirect coercive transfer arises 
when the presence of externalities or functional interdependencies leads to joint action 
on the part of policy-makers. Within the context of EMU, the open method most 
closely resembles the indirect coercive strain of policy transfer, since national labour 
market developments are now treated as matters of mutual concern owing to their 
potential effects on euro-zone monetary policy. While functional interdependence is 
present, the question remains to what extent successful policies will in fact be 
transferred between states. For example, the heterogeneity of euro-zone labour 
markets is such that one Member State’s meat could, if applied in a significantly 
different context, quickly amount to another Member State’s poison. Within EMU, 
the open method conforms less to the notion of policy transfer and more to the 
definition of lesson drawing, according to which ‘lessons are drawn from other places 
or times which do not necessarily result in policy or institutional change’ (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). In considering the novelty of the open method beyond the 
policy domain of EMU, therefore, the differences between transitional and terminal 
modes of integration, on the one hand, and policy transfer and lesson drawing on the 
other, appear to be largely commensurate. 
II. Governance and the Open Method of Co-ordination 
 
The open method can be seen as a new approach to governance in the light of three 
characteristics of governance in the EU: the principle of subsidiarity, flexibility and 
legitimacy. The Single European Act strained the original EU governance model with 
its emphasis on centralization, functional segmentation and vertically integrated 
structures (Lebessis and Paterson, 2001, p. 268). The deregulatory ethos in the rulings 
of the European Court, with an emphasis on removal of what in retrospect appear 
obvious barriers to trade, was largely unproblematic. With the Single Act, an 
ambitious legislative agenda identified the Community as a rule-setter on a grand 
scale (Calingaert, 1999). This agenda of positive integration, combined with greater 
use of qualified majority voting, raised questions as to the authority of the EC 
encapsulated by reference to the democratic deficit. The centralized system of 
governance did not adequately address the interests of the ‘peoples of Europe’, 
already at one remove from the EC. Increasingly complex policy formation, as a 
result in part of functional segmentation within the Council and the myriad of 
committees responsible for the tide of secondary legislation, served further to render 
the system opaque, distant and apparently unaccountable (Vos, 1997). New systems 
of governance needed to be found to address these concerns (Commission, 2001c). 
 One response was the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The principle4 determines the level of government at which decisions are 
taken in the EU (van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994). Concerned only with the 
Member States/EU axis, but developed to cover the strength of the legal norm that is 
used and as the basis for simplification of existing legislation, it is not clear to what 
extent the principle has impacted on policy formation (Maher, 1996). Nonetheless, it 
now forms an important part of the cultural frame within which policy formation 
takes place and is a tool in deciding whether or not particular action should be taken 
by the EU (de Búrca, 1999). The open method seems entirely consistent with the 
principle, with its emphasis on policy learning among different levels of government. 
The Lisbon Conclusions themselves note that a fully decentralized approach will be 
applied in line with the principle (European Council, 2000a, para 38). Arguably, the 
open method goes further and radicalizes subsidiarity; this is a static principle with its 
focus on what level of government at a particular time of rule formation in the policy 
process and with a continuing emphasis on hierarchy of structures. The open method, 
being focused on horizontal learning processes and peer pressure where individual 
action runs counter to broadly accepted principles, is dynamic in nature, heterarchical, 
decentred as a modus operandi and without any particular rule or single policy 
objective as an objective (Lebessis and Paterson, 2001, p. 292). 
 While co-ordination in the economic sphere addresses anxieties surrounding 
centralization in the light of positive integration, it replicates problems of functional 	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segmentation with a multiplicity of systems and a web of institutional 
interrelationships combining hard and soft co-ordination and with an 
intergovernmental edge (Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001), problems also 
found in justice and home affairs (Monar, 2001). Co-ordination is built into the Treaty 
for economic, fiscal and employment policies with a system of guide- lines and 
multilateral surveillance that can culminate in an adverse Council recommendation 
(or ultimately a fine under the excessive deficit procedure in relation to fiscal policy).5  
The Council assumes a key role in relation to coordinating processes both in terms of 
their functioning and, at the level of the European Council, in wider questions of 
system design, timetabling and policy objectives. The Euro-group, an informal 
grouping of euro-zone finance ministers with no law-making powers, also has the 
capacity to ensure co- ordination (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001). The Commission’s 
role of anal- ysis, neutrality and synopsis (Commission, 2001b, para. 13) is different 
from under the classic Monnet method and arguably weakened with its usual agenda-
setting function reduced (Hodson and Maher, 2000b). It can trigger a number of 
procedures, but the trigger is a recommendation and not a proposal, and hence can be 
modified by qualified majority voting in Council rather than unanimity (Harden, 
1999, p. 81). Its weakness may follow from the debacle of the Santer Commission’s 
resignation, but more specifically, from the emphasis on implicit and bottom-up 
policy co-ordination (Dyson, 2002a), signalled by the lukewarm reception to its 
communication on co-ordination (Commission, 2001b). This position could change 
given the capacity of the Commission historically to augment its role. It can 
contribute to effective co-ordination and gain influence through fulfilling a secretariat 
role and providing key intellectual resources, particularly given the rather clumsy 
nature of the processes (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001, p. 14; Goetschy, 1999). In its 
White Paper on Governance, the Commission notes its existing active role in the open 
method and its desire to remain active in the future, but warns against the method 
upsetting the institutional balance notably by marginalizing the European Parliament. 
Thus it suggests there should be a regular reporting mechanism for the Parliament so 
as to maintain the existing institutional balance (Commission, 2001c, p. 22). 
There are three main Council committees involved in the open method. The 
Economic and Finance Committee, an advisory committee, is the most important. It 
prepares the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (Ecofin) meetings, and has 
consultative and review functions, being responsible for the preparation of the broad 
economic policy guidelines and for the co-ordination of fiscal policy through the 
operation of the Stability and Growth Pact (Hodson and Maher, 2000b). The more 
recently established Employment Committee monitors employment policy under the 
Luxembourg process.6 The Economic Policy Committee monitors structural policy 
under the Cardiff process; is responsible for the macroeconomic dialogue; and helps 
formulate the broad economic policy guidelines, as well as contributing to the 
multilateral surveillance that flows from them.7 Policy areas overlap, e.g. one of the 
concerns of the Union is that of the ageing population, which raises issues touching 
on all three areas with co-ordination across committees dependent on chairs 
maintaining contact and exchanging information informally before reporting to 	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Council. Additional committees also may be created. The Nice Treaty requires the 
establishment of a Social Protection Committee to promote co-operation between the 
Commission and Member States on social protection policies,8 thus making social 
protection the third side of a welfare policy triangle with the related but separate sides 
being macroeconomic policy and employment policy (Rhodes, 2000). 
The difficulties of demarcation of responsibility and the interaction of the committees 
(save through their shared function of reporting to Ecofin), underlines the opacity and 
complexity of the institutional framework, with the Commission recommending 
greater visibility (Commission, 2001b, para. 4). It is perhaps incongruent to discuss 
opacity in a system dependent on transparency for its effectiveness, but the processes 
are simultaneously transparent and opaque in different ways. The opaque nature of the 
processes is partly due to their number and their complex institutional framework. It 
is also due to their relative novelty within the governance structures of the EU, with 
the emphasis on process, rather than outcome. The absence of hard law also renders 
the system opaque, with only soft law measures available outside the scope of the 
excessive deficit procedure, and with the attendant uncertainty as to their status or 
consequences. Transparency is essential for the processes, as learning is dependent on 
information exchange. However, the fragmentation of responsibility means the system 
lacks transparency beyond the core of elites – national and Community civil servants 
and the social partners through the macroeconomic dialogue – who are directly 
involved in preparing and discussing national reports, and in framing of broad 
guidelines. While this characteristic may be similar to that found within national 
policy-making processes, the issue is of greater concern in the EU where problems of 
legitimation are seen as more intractable. 
 The open method can also be seen as a form of ‘soft’ flexibility in contrast to that 
found under Art. 11 EC and Art. 40–43 EU. These provisions allow for closer co-
operation between states aspiring to greater integration than is currently envisaged 
under the treaties, by setting down specific steps that have to be taken in order to 
protect the interests of non-participants and the acquis (de Areilza, 1998; Philippart 
and Edwards, 1999). The provisions have yet to be invoked, although amendments 
introduced in Nice may change that,9 while the Commission has suggested their 
adoption specifically in relation to economic policy co-ordination (Commission, 
2001b, para. 18). Even with reform, the provisions form a legal straitjacket 
determining how much further co-operation can take place and reflect an anxiety 
about the ability of the EU to control outcomes. This can be contrasted with the open 
method that occurs in a space devoid of formal legal norms apart from the Treaty 
provisions themselves and the decisions establishing the relevant committees. There is 
no formal attempt to control outcomes (outside of fiscal policy of course), and process 
is determined by a system of benchmarking and lesson-drawing, emphasizing state 
competence and the voluntary alignment of policies. Thus, the open method provides 
real flexibility and marks a further maturation of the integration process. The desire of 
the EC to control outcomes, as manifest in the directive as the rule of choice in the 
single market, with its emphasis on common outcomes if not methods,10 is overcome 
by recognition of the importance of diversity at the national level in relation to policy 
formation, legal frameworks, ideational references and popular perceptions and 
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9 Art. 1(9)–(13) and Art. 2(1) Treaty of Nice, replacing Arts. 40–43 TEU and Art. 11 EC respectively. 
10 Art. 249 EC. 
reactions to either the European project generally or the specific policy being co-
ordinated. 
 
Finally, the open method goes some way to solving the intractable problem of the 
legitimacy of policy-making in the EU (Hodson and Maher, 2000b). Legitimation is 
presumed for national policy where it enjoys democratic endorsement, popular 
sovereignty being the legitimate source of power for the exercise of authority 
(Obradovic, 1996, p. 195; Verdun and Christiansen, 2000, p. 171). Even if a particular 
policy decision at the national level reflects learning through the open method, the 
system is one of ex ante implicit co- ordination rather than explicit co-ordination 
(Dyson, 2000a, p. 42) and, in the absence of the imposition of explicit obligations or 
sanctions, it is difficult to question the legitimacy of the rather tangential role of the 
EU in economic policy formation. On the other hand, the Union may have only 
limited success in claiming credit for policy outcomes, and the attendant legitimation 
that flows from that, where its role is so tangential. In fact, legitimacy questions could 
be raised even within the current framework. If a state is subject to a critical 
recommendation from the Council, then its government could ‘play the legitimacy 
card’. The absence of legal norms undermines any legitimacy of the process at the EU 
level – the rule of law being one, albeit flawed, means of securing legitimacy. The 
open-ended nature of the method allows for diversity and the government’s 
democratic mandate legitimates its dissenting voice in the light of any adverse 
recommendation for breach of the broad economic policy guidelines. At the same 
time, dissenting voices within the state may take up the alternative stance proffered by 
the EU, thus prompting debate which has the capacity to shed light on the policies, 
processes and principles underlying them. 
 If co-ordination leads to a policy shift to the EU, then the national democratic 
credentials will be lost and the well-rehearsed arguments about the legitimacy of the 
EU – lack of a democratic legitimacy; no constitutional mandate framing shared 
identity and values; the conditional legitimacy of outputs – may re-emerge (Hodson 
and Maher, 2000b). Shared values usually equate with some sort of 
constitutionalization and the difficulty here is that the sound money and sound finance 
paradigm is one that is not constitutionalized to the same degree in all Member States; 
see, e.g., the recent Irish example and compare with the attitude to sound money in 
Germany. The extent to which there is a discrepancy in the embeddedness of that 
paradigm means that, if the economic climate becomes more difficult, the paradigm 
itself could be questioned and incompatible policy stances emerge which undermine 
policy co-ordination. Alternatively, it could be argued that the paradigm would really 
become embedded only when it is embraced as a vital anchor in times of economic 
difficulty. 
 Thus the emphasis on national policy responses, the explicit recognition of the 
competence of the Member States in this field, the absence of closure in terms of 
outcome all point to a process embedded in a national democratic framework. At the 
same time, how co-ordination develops, both in terms of the exertion of peer pressure 
against a recalcitrant state and in the adoption of unpopular national policies inspired 
by co-ordination, may allow the question of legitimacy to be raised in relation to the 
EC processes. 
 
III. Why has the Open Method of Co-ordination Developed in Relation to 
Economic Policies? 
 
EMU involves a direct transfer of monetary sovereignty from the national to the 
Union level (Alesina and Grilli, 1992; Bean, 1998; Buti and Sapir, 1998). Such 
sovereignty now rests with the Eurosystem of (participating) national central banks 
and the supranational European Central Bank (ECB). EMU is not however, solely a 
monetary phenomenon nor a single rule exercise (Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001). 
The loss of national monetary and exchange-rate policies significantly alters the 
nature of macroeconomic policy-making in the euro-zone (Allsopp and Vines, 1998). 
National authorities may no longer turn to such instruments when faced with an 
asymmetric economic disturbance (Eichengreen, 1998). The burden of adjustment is 
transferred on to such alternative instruments as budgetary stabilizers, or wages and 
prices (Begg and Hodson, 2000). At the same time the creation of a currency zone 
substantially deepens economic integration, thus increasing the scope for both 
institutional and regional spillover (Bayer, 1999). Institutional spillover arises from a 
situation in which a single monetary institution faces 12 separate national economies. 
Divergence between the policy preferences of the ECB and those of all or some 
national fiscal authorities could present a barrier to the achievement of price stability 
(Ardy, 2001). No matter how credible the ECB appears, stable prices are increasingly 
difficult to achieve where there are, for example, loose inflationary fiscal policies. 
Wage developments at the national level also have an effect on euro-zone inflation 
and thus national wage setting mechanisms are of some concern to the ECB 
(Kilponen et al., 1999). 
 EMU also strengthens the ties between national economies such that national 
policy effects are now felt more in the euro-zone, creating the risk of regional 
spillover (Gros and Thygesen, 1998). Previously, an increase in the deficit spending 
of, say, Italy may have yielded higher Italian interest rates. The same action now may 
trigger a rise in euro-zone interest rates. This means that the entire euro-zone would 
pay the price for Italy’s fiscal profligacy. From an Italian perspective, the cost would 
be spread among its peers, thus diluting the strength of previous incentives for fiscal 
rectitude. 
 The Union has responded to fears of institutional and regional spillover through a 
combination of ‘hard co-ordination’ in fiscal policy and ‘soft co- ordination’ in 
economic policy (Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001). Both forms of co-ordination arise 
out of Member States’ commitment to treat their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern and to co-ordinate them in the Council with a view to achieving 
inter alia sustainable and non-inflationary growth.11 If economists have generally 
welcomed the principle of such co- ordination under EMU, they have failed to agree 
on the precise form that it should take (Mooslechner and Scheuez, 1999). 
The Treaty eventually delivered a monetarist vision of EMU in which policy is 
dominated by a supranational and independent European Central Bank, driven by the 
primary objective of maintaining price stability. The economic dimension of EMU 
falls far short of the Werner Report (Commission, 1970), with an intergovernmental 
commitment by Member States to regard their economic policy as a matter of mutual 
concern (Dyson, 2000a). This represents a rejection of the parallel principle, 
according to which a transfer of national monetary policies to the European level is 
matched by an analogous assignment of economic policies (Dyson, 2000a, p. 32). 
From the perspective of political economy, this rejection has been attributed to a lack 
of appetite amongst the Member States for further political integration (Verdun and 
Christiansen, 2000). While the lack of such support is well documented, the political 	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economy perspective can overstate the extent to which current arrangements under 
EMU are second best and arguments have been made in defence of EMU’s existing 
macroeconomic credentials. Such arguments suggest that, given the radical 
differences between euro-zone economies with respect to production, structure and 
labour market flexibility, a single adjustment response seems unworkable and 
adjustment mechanisms at the national level seem preferable, since they are better 
suited to their economy’s own specificity (Mayes and Viren, 2000). Supranational 
measures are required only to avert negative spillover. A belief in this logic pervades 
a policy architecture characterized by supranational institutions, institutional linkages, 
common policy and both hard and soft policy co-ordination. 
 The risk of regional spillover is addressed primarily through hard co- ordination in 
the Stability and Growth Pact, where co-ordination is associated with convergence 
towards predetermined targets (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001, p. 10). States agree to 
maintain their budget deficits within 3 per cent of GDP and their medium-term 
budgetary position close to balance or in surplus (Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001). 
The Pact is enforced through multi-lateral surveillance and the excessive deficit 
procedure. The former requires each Member State to formulate a stability 
programme (or convergence programmes in the case of states outside the euro-zone), 
for national economic policy that conforms to the spirit of the pact. Compliance with 
the terms of the pact leaves room for budgetary manœuvre in the face of an 
asymmetric economic disturbance (Artis and Buti, 2000). In the event of deviation 
from the spirit of the pact, the Council can issue a recommendation for corrective 
action. In the event of an infringement of the pact, the excessive deficit procedure can 
be triggered, culminating in formal sanctions, including fines. 
The risk of institutional spillover is addressed by opening channels of communication 
between existing supranational bodies. A representative of the ECB attends meetings 
of the Ecofin, while the President of Ecofin is present at meetings of the Eurosystem’s 
Governing Council. The Economic and Finance Committee, an advisory body 
consisting of representatives from national finance ministries, national central banks 
and the ECB, supports this political communication at the technical level. Concern 
over wage developments in the euro-zone is addressed through the macroeconomic 
dialogue, involving the social partners. This ensures that national governments, the 
Eurosystem and, to a lesser extent, social partners meet regularly to exchange 
information and opinions. 
 The main instrument for the soft co-ordination of economic policies is the broad 
economic policy guidelines,12 drawn up annually by the Commission and Council and 
adopted by the European Council. The consistency of national economic policies with 
the economic objectives of the Union and (in the case of participating Member States) 
with that of euro-zone monetary policy are then assessed. In the event of a deviation 
from the Guidelines the Council can – as in the recent case of Ireland – adopt a non-
binding recommendation against the Member State in question. Unlike the excessive 
deficit procedure, the guidelines are not supported by any sanction, relying on the 
commitment of states and peer pressure. 
 The Union’s approach to adjustment is manifest in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and 
Cologne processes. These processes are a response to – amongst other factors – the 
greater need for factor market flexibility under EMU (Hodson and Maher 2000a). The 
Union’s chosen response employs an unambiguously soft policy approach (Wessels 
and Linsenmann, 2001), rather than seeking a transfer of competence to the EU. 	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While each Member State faces an adjustment challenge that implies a need for 
greater factor market flexibility, the precise nature of such flexibility is likely to differ 
from one national factor market to another. Thus, while the Union encourages the 
pursuit of such flexibility, initiatives at the national level remain of primary 
importance. 
 Having completed this brief tour d’horizon, we can now view the open method in a 
broader context. It is apparent that phrases in the open method, such as peer review, 
surveillance, benchmarking and best practice, derive their meaning from a specific 
understanding of EMU. According to this viewpoint, supranational monetary policy is 
best complemented by an intensive transgovernmental approach to economic policy 
(Wallace, 2000, p. 33). This approach has three components. First, hard co-ordination 
mechanisms are set in place to prevent the occurrence of regional spillover. Second, 
channels of soft co- ordination are established between policy actors, in an attempt to 
achieve a consistent policy mix. Finally, a soft co-ordinated approach to adjustment is 
developed to increase the efficiency of policy instruments at the national level. The 
method was designed to implement the third component. Its first and second stages 
help to identify common challenges for Member States and encourage a common 
approach to the formation of objectives and performance indicators. If the 
supranational level is more significant in the first two stages, the initiative in the third 
stage comes from the national level. This allows Member States to tailor their policies 
to the precise characteristics of their economy, thus avoiding any negative side effects 
associated with a one-size- fits-all approach to adjustment. The final stage offers them 
a useful means to evaluate their progress, without recourse to legally binding 
measures or sanctions. In short, the open method recognizes the optimality of the 
national approach. By concentrating on the enablement of individual Member States, 
the chances of achieving the Union’s goals are, it is argued, maximized. 
 
The Irish Budget 
 
Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry note that the undeniable efforts taken so far have not 
succeeded in creating a genuine culture of co-ordination in relation to economic 
policy (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001, p. 12). This can be seen in one of the first 
tests of the economic policy architecture when Ireland became embroiled in a 
controversy over the compatibility of its economic policy with the broad economic 
policy guidelines. In June 2000, the Council recommended that the Irish government 
adopt an anti-cyclical stance against overheating conditions in the economy. The next 
Irish budget, the last before a general election, included a series of tax cuts and 
allowance increases that amounted to an annualized cost of 1.5 per cent of GDP. This 
was matched on the expenditure side with an 18 per cent increase in voted current 
expenditure and a 29 per cent increase in voted capital expenditure. The update of the 
Irish stability programme, released on budget day, projected a reduction in the general 
government surplus as a percentage of GDP from a surplus of 4.7 per cent in 2000 to 
a surplus of 4.3 per cent in 2001. Ecofin issued a formal recommendation that 
identified two main sources of inconsistency between the guidelines and the budget. 
First, the direct tax cuts were unlikely to induce greater labour force participation in 
an already tight labour market. Given the current monetary stance in the euro-zone, 
such fiscal policy was inappropriate to the overall macroeconomic policy mix. 
Second, the expenditure side of the budget generated a pro-cyclical rather than an 
anti-cyclical fiscal stance. Thus Ecofin suggested that the government take 
‘countervailing budgetary measures during the current fiscal year ... to ensure that no 
reduction in the underlying budgetary surplus from 2000 takes place’ (Ecofin, 2001). 
 The Irish government’s initial response criticized the recommendation on grounds 
ranging from economic logic to the covetousness towards Ireland’s booming 
economy. Although the doubts about the ratification of the Nice Treaty following 
Ireland’s censure might have been thought to be scare- mongering by Irish officials, 
the negative result in the referendum, two days after the Council was to meet to 
consider the Irish position, pointedly demonstrated the importance of issue-linkage in 
the European context. So far, Ireland has not taken any corrective budgetary action, 
with the Finance Minister stating that ‘the concerns expressed in the Recommendation 
were based on the wrong premise’ (McCreevy, 2001). His case is strengthened by the 
OECD’s recent suggestion that Irish estimates of its government revenue for 2001 
were excessively cautious (OECD, 2001). It suggests that Ireland’s budget for this 
period will be ‘roughly neutral’, thus contradicting the broad economic policy 
guidelines (and indeed the Irish stability programme). These differences show the 
capacity for divergent opinion in relation to the guidelines and the difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of clearly identifying policy as right or wrong. 
 The soft policy foundations proved no obstacle to communication, as the Irish case 
occupied considerable media attention. The Wall Street Journal, defending Ireland’s 
position, had an article by the Irish Finance Minister and a comment by the leading 
supply-side writer, Arthur Laffer (Gillespie 2001). Policy communication was not a 
problem for Ecofin, although it was for the Commission, which was to some extent 
scape-goated by the Council in the light of widespread criticism of the 
recommendation (Dyson, 2002a). What the episode shows is that co-ordination allows 
debate to flourish, and for a country to defend openly its own view (Mayes and Viren, 
2001). While this may improve transparency, engage a wider public in the debate and 
shed some light on the policy processes involved, it also raises implications for 
democracy, with the elected government’s preferences being subject to question as a 
result of guidelines agreed at a supranational level. At the same time, because of the 
existence of EMU, national policy failure in the light of the sound finance and sound 
money paradigm could have serious implications for the other members of the euro-
zone which do not have any direct voice at the national level and rely on the open 
method to avoid having any consequent burden shifted on to them. While such a risk 
of burden-shifting is real in the case of larger states, it is insignificant in the case of a 
small economy like Ireland, and the credibility of the system is thus undermined by 
the application of the same rules to large and small economies, irrespective of their 
relative effects on the euro-zone. Although Ireland will escape any form of binding 
sanction, the true costs of its actions have yet to be established, the situation being so 
recent as to be necessarily inconclusive. If Ireland suffers a lack of political goodwill 
from its peers and a loss of credibility in the EU as a result of its recalcitrance, then 
the credibility of the Union’s soft policy approach may itself increase as a 
consequence. 
 
IV. The Open Method of Co-ordination as Novel 
 
The Conditions for the Open Method 
 
The classification of the open method as a new form of governance is not without 
difficulty. Lebessis and Paterson in their analysis of EU governance put forward a 
paradigm of collective learning that looks very like the system of open co-ordination 
that we see in relation to economic policy (Lebessis and Paterson, 2001, p. 288). They 
suggest that collective learning goes to the heart of a new understanding of control 
and responsibility in EU governance. Member States face generic problems in 
specific contexts. The specificity of the context obscures structural components of 
problems, which results in a failure to understand the underlying causes of a particular 
problem, which are common. Calame proposes that problems be approached at a local 
level by describing essential features of the given context without being exhaustive 
(Calame, 2001). The next stage involves a comparison of the information produced in 
different contexts in order to identify those characteristics that are structural and those 
that are determined by particular context. Having identified the common structural 
components, the Member States then have a range of responses as to how to proceed. 
The policy process remains open and there is no prescribed solution. What happens 
within this iterative process is that common principles can be developed with a move 
away from control of outcome to an obligation to respect common, articulated, 
principles. 
 The experience of the open method suggests that this approach is central to a 
particular construction of EMU and even within EMU may be less effective for 
structural policy than for employment policy. This in part is because of the much 
broader scope of structural policy, but also on the basis that, while interdependent 
economies and the associated risk of economic spillover require a common solution, 
structural reform is not, as of yet, about interdependencies but rather about states 
facing similar challenges. A common solution is neither on the table nor necessarily 
desirable. Whether the open method can be applied effectively in other policy sectors 
depends on whether there are equivalent initial conditions to those which exist for 
economic policy. In other words, there must be a cultural frame (Fligstein and Mara-
Drita, 1996), as entrenched within the Treaty as for EMU; this implies that it is best 
applied within the context of single market initiatives. It is this cultural frame which 
provided the agreed, if not entirely fixed, paradigm of sound money and sound 
finance (Dyson, 2000b). This made co-ordination essential for economic policy and 
subordinated employment policy to the sound money, sound finance paradigm such 
that co-ordination is now partial and focused on those aspects of employment policy 
which coincide most closely with this paradigm, thus with, e.g., wage policy excluded 
(Goetschy, 1999). The strong links between monetary policy and economic policies, 
where monetary policy is uniform and highly centralized, in effect mandated co-
ordination of economic policy, while the diversity of national approaches required 
that co-ordination remain at the national level so that there is adequate room for 
manœuvre in response to asymmetric shocks. Co-ordination also enjoys a long history 
of project-building by key elites (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999), who over time 
develop a common discourse such that the open method is, in some sense, just another 
stage in previous iterative processes that began with the establishment of the 
Economic Policy Committee in 197413 and the Werner Report in 1970. Co-ordination 
can arise only where there is support from the European Council which, in relation to 
economic policy, is taking a more active role following Lisbon with an additional 
meeting in spring each year to assess co-ordination. The central role of the European 
Council also underlines the intergovernmental nature of co-ordination and ensures 
that processes remain open in terms of outcomes, such that there is no attempt to 
centralize policy formation or to introduce top-down methods of integration. 
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A Transitional Mechanism? 
 
A permanent system of innovation in policy formation – through refinement of 
existing practices or introduction of new ones like the open method – is not transitory 
unless there is a transfer of competence to the EU. The open method may lead to the 
formal reassignment of policy powers from the national to the EU level and hence 
may not provide a durable alternative to the traditional EU model. At this stage it 
operates as a form of negative co-ordination, with monitoring and peer pressure 
ensuring compliance of national policy instruments through agreed commitments, 
rather than as a form of positive integration with agreement on a specific policy 
approach at the EU level (Dyson, 2002a, Scharpf, 1999, ch. 2). The emphasis is on 
not engaging in certain policies rather than agreeing a specific supranational policy 
and then implementing it at the national level. The methodology of learning by 
benchmarking and best practice means Member States must redefine their economic 
policy by taking the lead in opinion formation with a view to acting as a catalyst in 
the formation of ideas (Dyson, 2000a, p. 5). The system, in short, seeks to make a 
virtue out of the inevitable and continuing diversity institutionally and ideationally in 
the way that Member States define and conduct their economic policy. This means 
that any importing of policy ideas as a result of co- ordination is conditional on the 
question of ‘fit’, i.e. the extent to which the existing policy framework is consistent 
with any proposed change (Dyson, 2000a; Maher, 1996), or on the extent to which an 
effective transition mechanism is built into the new policy frame. The emphasis on 
iterative processes removes the traditional intergovernmental emphasis on great 
moments, pointing instead to a policy learning continuum, thus introducing the 
prospect of incremental change and making it a less risky prospect. The extent to 
which the open method is a new, durable form of governance depends on the extent to 
which the process can remain open and tolerate partial, fragmented and interim 
outcomes, formulated in the knowledge that dialogue will continue (Shaw, 1999, p. 
338). Co-ordination as a form of inter-administrative governance may lead to the 
exchange of ideas and the emergence of a common discourse for the ‘club’ of key 
officials and ministries involved (Levitt and Lord, 2000, p. 217), such that policy 
transfer is made easier as a result of the reframing of domestic discourse over time 
(Dyson, 2000b, p. 649). This process of informal institutionalization of national 
administrations and their common interest in finding common solutions to common 
problems through deliberative interaction could be described as deliberative 
supranationalism (Joerges and Neyer, 1997). 
 Within the sound money, sound finance paradigm, the rejection of transfer of 
competence in the field of factor market policy appears as a necessary truth. The 
history of economic and monetary integration shows that necessary truths can appear 
contingent in the presence of changing conceptual paradigms (Quine, 1951). This 
means that if a ‘window of opportunity’ emerges (King- don, 1984), it may result in a 
shift in belief systems such that that which is deemed impossible now, e.g. the transfer 
of employment policy (including wage policy) to the EU, may become possible. Co-
ordination could become a form of positive integration with policy transfer to the 
European level. While this suggestion points to a co-ordination-begets-integration 
model, even in the face of the Irish experience and the conflict it generated, it is 
nonetheless important to remember that by its very nature the open method does not 
preclude a shift to positive co-ordination, no matter how unlikely that looks in the 
current political and economic climate. Should there be such a shift, the open method 
could be seen as a transitional mechanism leading to transfer of competence and a 
pre-cursor to other, more familiar forms of EU governance. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The open method provides both functional and political advantages (Mosher, 2000). 
On a functional level, it emphasizes policy change by states, but recognizes that there 
may be collective action problems blocking progress or that collective responses 
might reduce costs. Several or all states might wish to move in tandem, or at least 
instigate reform in the knowledge of each other’s practices and agendas. The open 
method thus allows both co-ordinated and individual responses, as appropriate with 
the possibility of convergence, but with an emphasis on policy learning. However, the 
Irish case study shows that individual responses are allowed only within an agreed 
spectrum. Politically, the open method is an alternative to traditional governance 
methods without precluding a return to them, and thus is not inconsistent with the 
revitalization of the Community method advocated by the Commission in its White 
Paper on Governance (Commission, 2001c, p. 29). The Commission retains a role and 
existing Union competence is not challenged, while the possibility of further transfer 
of competence remains. The flexibility of the open method, which allows for policy 
formation best suited to national needs, albeit within the context of best practice and 
transparency between states, avoids problems of ill-fitting Europeanization of national 
policies and attendant dissatisfaction by governments and their electorates. Diversity 
is also its greatest weakness in that the lack of formal sanctions or binding legal 
norms allows states to proceed in opposition to any agreed principles (as contained in 
the guidelines), thus potentially undermining the credibility of this form of 
governance. 
 It is too early to say whether the open method can deliver the strategic goal of the 
EU as the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
within ten years. The experience of the Stockholm European Council of March 2001 
shows that the method is advanced and working well in relation to employment 
policy, with the European Council setting targets for employment rates and setting up 
a high-level task force on skills and mobility to examine barriers in the labour market. 
Co-ordination is improved for the social model with indicators on work quality to be 
developed by the end of 2001 and work quality being included as a general objective 
in the 2002 employment guidelines. A two-prong approach is taken in relation to 
discrimination between men and women at work reflecting both hard and soft co-
ordination. Indicators are to be drawn up for pay discrimination, while for other terms 
and conditions existing legislation will be updated by the end of 2001 (European 
Council, 2001). For pensions, a similar mix of hard and soft co-ordination is 
advocated, with reports being presented to Council at future summits and reform of 
Regulation 1408/71 on social security co-ordination proposed. In other sectors, e.g. 
enterprise policy, there are teething problems with the open method, notably 
recognition of the need to improve the quality, time-lines and availability of statistics 
for benchmarking. 
 The answer to the question – is the open method of co-ordination a new form of 
governance? – is ‘yes, perhaps and no’. Yes, in the sense that in the context of EMU 
the open method is founded on a rejection of notions of policy transfer and thus, 
within the Wallace and Wallace framework, represents a novel form of integration. 
What is also new is the explicit naming of such a method by the European Council, 
along with its association with a new strategic vision of the EU and its extension to 
other policy areas. Perhaps, in that the novelty of the open method in other policy 
areas depends on the existence of similar conditions to those found in EMU. It is only 
if such conditions exist that the open method is likely to reject from the very outset 
the prospect of a transfer of competence to the EU level. No, in that, even if such 
conditions preclude a transfer of competence at present, the open method is by its 
very nature open, and may in time lead to a convergence of ideas or practices which 
could culminate ultimately in support for competence transfer to the EU. 
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